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EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH DURING
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of an employer to express himself freely concern-
ing the unionization of his employees has been an important and
controversial problem in labor relations since the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. The controversy is
the result of the National Labor Relations Board's view that its
primary function under the Act is to protect the employees' stat-
utory right to organize. At times the Board's protective efforts
have directly conflicted with the employer's constitutional right
of free speech, generating ardent debate concerning the degree
to which the Board should restrict free speech to achieve its
aims, if it should restrict it at all.
This Note will examine the historical development of em-
ployer free speech regulations and analyze recent Board and fed-
eral court decisions interpreting the first amendment and statu-
tory guarantees of employer free speech. A comparison will be
made to United States Supreme Court free speech decisions in
the nonlabor context, including the reasons articulated for the
different analyses. The Note will evaluate the Court's reasoning
and conclude with possible alternate solutions for deciding free
speech issues in labor cases.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH
A. National Labor Relations Act
Prior to 1935, there were no legal restrictions on the scope
of employer conduct towards, or speech to, employees concern-
ing their attempts to unionize. Employers were free to discour-
age union activities by bribery, misrepresentations of facts con-
cerning the union, interrogation of employees, surveillance of
union activities, threats of reprisals, and actual discharge.1 The
1. Wimberly & Steckel, NLRB Campaign Laboratory Conditions Doctrine and Free
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enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)2 in
1935 dramatically altered this situation. Section 7 of the Act
guaranteed employees the right to form unions3 and Section 8(1)
provided that interference with this right by employers would
constitute an unfair labor practice.4
In the early years of the Act, the National Labor Relations
Board adopted a strict neutrality standard for an employer's po-
sition with respect to his employees' organizational choice. The
basis for this standard was the high value the Board placed on
the freedom to participate in union activities without any inter-
ference6 and the Board's belief that even the slightest suggestion
by an employer would be magnified by the employees' economic
dependence on the employer.6
In early cases under the Wagner Act, the Board found that
employer speech in violation of the Act had "occurred against a
background of open manifestations of hostility to self-organiza-
tion." 7 The Board was thus able to avoid first amendment chal-
lenges to its strict neutrality doctrine until cases arose concern-
ing less serious employer conduct. Federal courts of appeals
reviewing Board decisions were divided concerning the scope of
employer free speech under the Act, and whether the Board's
strict neutrality standard could be reconciled with the first
Speech Revisted, 32 MERCER L. REV. 535, 536 (1981).
2, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
168 (1976)).
3. Section 7 of the NLRA of 1935 provided: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
4. Section 8(1) of the NLRA of 1935 provided: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7." 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1976)).
5. Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access
In NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757 (1979).
6. Id.; Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at 537; Koretz, Employer Interference
With Union Organization Versus Employers Free Speech, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399,
401 (1960).
7. Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis. L. REV.
211, 217 (quoting NLRB, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATONs BOARD TO THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR UPON S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1530, S. 1580
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amendment.8 In response to this conflict, the Supreme Court de-
cided to review the issue in the case of NLRB v. Virginia Elec-
tric & Power Co..'
The employer in Virginia Electric had posted bulletins and
delivered a speech urging employees to organize without the as-
sistance of a union. Reviewing the Board's order, the Court held
that employer speech concerning labor problems is constitution-
ally protected so long as the speech does not rise to the level of
coercion.10
In its analysis of the employer's antiunion statements, the
Court found that the statements alone were not coercive, but
indicated that such statements may rise to the level of coercion
if the remarks were considered as part of a coercive course of
conduct.11
Three essential principles concerning free speech can be ex-
tracted from Virginia Electric. First, an employer may express
his opinion on general labor policies without necessarily violat-
ing the Act; this signified the demise of the strict neutrality doc-
trine. Second, a determination of whether a violation of the Act
exists necessitates an examination by the Board of the total con-
duct or activities of the employer. Finally, a determination of
whether an employer's overall conduct had a coercive impact on
workers may be made by scrutinizing the employer's speech in
conjunction with his overall conduct.
1 2
As a result of Virginia Electric, appellate courts viewed em-
ployer speech as distinct from other employer conduct; as such,
it was not a factor in the "totality of conduct" test.13 In one im-
portant area, however, the Board indicated that coercion might
be created by the circumstances of a speech as well as by its
contents. In In re Clark Bros. Co.,1 the Board held that an em-
ployee violated the Act by requiring his employees to attend an
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941) (adopting the strict
neutrality doctrine). But cf. NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940) (anti-
union statements could be privileged despite discriminatory discharge and other
reprisals).
9. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
10. Id. at 477.
11. Id. at 479.
12. Comment, supra note 5, at 759.
13. Id. at 759-60 (citing Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 132, 134 (1947)
and Fisher Governor Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1294 (1946)).
14. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
19841
3
Eaves: Employer Free Speech During Representation Elections
Published by Scholar Commons, 1984
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
antiunion speech during working hours. Recognizing that the
speech might have been constitutionally protected in itself, the
Board held that subjecting an employee to antiunion speeches
during working hours was "inherently coercive. '' 5
B. The Taft-Hartley Act
In 1947, Congress enacted amendments to the National La-
bor Relations Act in what became known as the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947.16 Section 8(c), the primary provision dealing with
free speech, basically reiterated the Supreme Court's holding in
Virginia Electric by statutorily providing that employer speech
does not constitute an unfair labor practice "if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.'
7
The Board recognized that the enactment of section 8(c) af-
forded greater protection to employer free speech.'8 Despite this
acknowledgement, the Board soon developed new regulations
which narrowed the scope of protection provided by section 8(c).
One such line of regulation developed from the Board's
landmark case of In re General Shoe Corp.'9
In General Shoe, the employer's president brought small
groups of employees to his office and read to them an antiunion
15. Id. at 805. The Second Circuit, in upholding the Board's order, did not rest its
opinion on the "compulsory audience" doctrine of the Board. Instead, the court upheld
the Board's order on the basis that the union representatives were not afforded a similar
opportunity to address the employees. NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d
Cir. 1947).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197.
17. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947)(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 258(c)
(1976)).
18. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 49 (1948). The Board's comments, however, indicate that it
was not in agreement with Congress' view of the employer's first amendment right and
that it would not give up entirely its previous interpretation of the "totality of conduct"
doctrine. The Board stated that section 8(c)
[a]ppears to enlarge somewhat the protection previously accorded by the origi-
nal statute and to grant immunity beyond that comtemplated by the free
speech guarantees of the Constitution. For example, the Clark Bros. "compul-
sory audience" doctrine has been held to be invalidated by this section of the
act. Nor can a non-coercive speech any longer be held to violate the act be-
cause at other times, and on other occasions, the employer has committed
other unfair labor practices. However, words and conduct may be so inter-
twined as to be considered a single coercive act.
Id. (emphasis added).
19. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
[Vol. 35
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address. Supervisors also visited employees' homes to campaign
against the union. The Board held that while the employer's ac-
tivities did not constitute unfair labor practices, "certain of
them created an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and un-
trammeled choice by the employees," and such conduct war-
ranted the invalidation of a representation election.20 The Board
envisioned its role in representation elections as "providing a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhib-
ited desires of the employees."21
While the Board decided in General Shoe that section 8(c)
was applicable only to unfair labor practice cases, it strictly ap-
plied this second step analysis of "laboratory conditions" in the
ensuing years. The political composition of the Board was
largely determinative of how strictly section 8(c) was read.22
III. A Focus ON EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH TODAY: WHAT CAN
AN EMPLOYER SAY ABOUT A UNION'S EFFECT ON THE COMPANY?
A. The Gissel Standard
In 1969 the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.,2 3 articulated the present standard used by the Board and
the federal courts to distinguish an employer's protected speech
from unprotected speech. Gissel was a consolidation of four un-
fair labor practice cases, 24 one of which, NLRB v. Sinclair Co.,25
raised the issue of whether an employer's communications to his
employees were protected by the first amendment and section
8(c) of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Re-
lations Act.
In Sinclair, the Teamsters Union had begun an organiza-
tional drive at the company's Holyoke, Massachusetts division
20. Id. at 125-26.
21. Id. at 127.
22. Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at 542; Comment, supra note 5, at 764-65.
23. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
24. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's Inc.,
398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir.
1968); and NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). Sinclair was argued sepa-
rately, but was disposed of in the Gissel opinion because it presented many of the same
questions. 395 U.S. at 580.
25. 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
19841
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in July, 1965. At that time the employees were not represented
by any union although they had been so represented in the early
19501S. 26 At the end of the summer, the Teamsters notified the
company that it represented a majority of the company's wire
weavers as a result of signed authorization cards. The union pe-
titioned for an election which was set for December 9, 1965.
During the organizational drive, the president of the Holyoke di-
vision made numerous efforts in the form of talks, letters, and
pamphlets to dissuade his employees from joining the union. He
emphasized the precarious financial condition of the company,
the possibility that a strike could close the plant, and the age
and lack of education of the workers, which would make their
reemployment difficult. He also graphically alluded to the com-
panies in the Holyoke-Springfield area that had allegedly gone
out of business because of union demands. 7
The union lost the election in a close vote and filed both
unfair labor practice charges and objections to the election. The
Board found that the president's communications with his em-
ployees constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act and also interfered with the exercise of em-
ployee free choice and the holding of a fair election. The election
was set aside and a bargaining order issued.28 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the order of the Board, agreeing with
its findings and conclusions.29 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the company challenged, on first amendment grounds, the hold-
ings of the Board and the court of appeals.30
In analyzing the first amendment issue, the Court first af-
firmed that an employer's free speech right to communicate his
views to his employees was firmly established in section 8(c) of
the Act. In doing so, the Court viewed section 8(c) as a means to
implement the first amendment."' The Court stated, however,
that the scope of the employer's right must be viewed in the
context of its labor relations setting. An employer's right of free
26. A three month long strike over contract negotiations with the American Wire
Weavers Protection Association in 1952 ended with the plant's reopening without a
union contract and the employees without union representation. 395 U.S. at 587.
27. Id. at 587-89.
28. Id. at 589.
29. Id. at 590.
30. Id. at 616.
31. Id. at 617.
622 [Vol. 35
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speech must be balanced with the employees' equal right to as-
sociate freely as provided in the Act. The balancing of these
rights "must take into account the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the
former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended impli-
cations of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear." 2 The Court then proceeded to establish
the standard now used by the federal courts and the Board.
According to the Court, an employer is free to speak, with
some limitations, on two subjects. First, an employer may speak
against unions in general and against the particular union seek-
ing representation, provided such expression does not contain a
threat of reprisal or force or a promise of benefits that may in-
fluence employees before the election. Second, an employer may
make predictions regarding the economic consequences he be-
lieves unionization will have on his business. These predictions,
however, must be based on objective facts and indicate that the
probable consequences are beyond the employer's control. If
there is any implication that the consequences will result from
the employer's own actions for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to him, the prediction is a threat of
retaliation and is not protected by the first amendment.3
By applying this standard to the facts of the case before it,
the Court upheld the decision of the appeals court and the
Board that the president's statements and communications were
intended and understood by the employees as a threat of retalia-
tory discharge, and not as a reasonable prediction that unioniza-
tion would cause the plant to close. The Court noted that the
employer had no objective basis for his statements and that the
Board had often found that statements concerning plant closings
are indeed perceived by employees as threats, not honest
forecasts.34
An analysis of the Gissel opinion raises several significant
questions concerning the standard articulated by the Court for
distinguishing protected from unprotected speech. First, what
was the Court's basis for this standard? In Gissel, the Court at-
tempted to interpret section 8(c) in light of specific types of ex-
32. Id.
33. Id. at 618.
34. Id. at 619-20.
19841 623
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pression. By stating in the first part of the standard that an em-
ployer could express his views of unions in general and of the
specific union seeking representation as long as the statements
were not threats or promises of benefits, the Court did little
more than restate the section. In developing the second part of
the standard, however, the Court was confronted with an expres-
sion that required more complex interpretation. While an em-
ployer's prediction was definitely an expression within the
meaning of "view, argument, or opinion" in section 8(c), when
did it cross the threshold and become a threat, therefore outside
8(c)'s protection? Without citing any authority, 5 the Court held
that a prediction was protected speech only if it was based on
objective fact. In no other area has the Court held the exercise
of free speech to such a high standard, 36 and the Court's opinion
sheds little light concerning the basis for this choice. While the
Court was expressly concerned about the unique influence an
employer's speech would have on his economically dependent
employees, 37 it did not explain why the objective fact standard
was the most appropriate standard for regulating speech in this
special setting. Could not the same end be achieved by a less
stringent standard, such as allowing employers the right of "fair
comment"?
In addition to questions concerning its basis, the Gissel
standard also raises questions concerning its adequacy to solve
the problem raised in the case. Did the Supreme Court's articu-
lation and application of the objective fact standard in Gissel
provide sufficient guidance to the courts and the Board to allow
them to effectively and consistently determine what employers
can lawfully say to their employees concerning the effect of
unionization? Are employers now in a better position to know
what is protected and what is unprotected speech? A considera-
tion of recent federal appellate court cases and Board decisions
will illustrate how the Gissel standard has been applied and pro-
vide a basis for answering these adequacy questions.
35. Id. at 618. The Court cited Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263, 274 n.20 (1965). The citation, however, is not authority for the entire objective fact
standard, but only for that portion which permits an employer "to convey a management
decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization." 395 U.S. at 618.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 105-20.
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35
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B. Federal Courts of Appeals
Recent decisions of the federal courts of appeals indicate
that the courts evaluate an employer's speech by applying both
parts of the Gissel standard. If an employer's comments express
his views about unionism or the particular union seeking repre-
sentation, the courts will evaluate the wording of the comment
to determine if it contains a threat of reprisal or a promise of
benefits. If the employer's comments contain any indication of
future consequences of unionization, the courts will decide first
if it is a prediction. If it is, they will then apply the Gissel limi-
tations to see if the prediction is allowable. 8 It is at this point of
the analysis, when the courts must apply the objective fact stan-
dard, that the effectiveness of the Gissel decision is tested, for it
is here that the courts must decide what constitutes an objective
fact. As the individual circuits have struggled with this issue, a
variety of answers has emerged.
According to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
NLRB v. Hasbro Industries, Inc.,39 something more concrete
than an honest or sincere belief is required to protect an em-
ployer's prediction under the Gissel standard. In Hasbro, the
court considered two letters sent to employees during an organi-
zational campaign. In these letters, the employer suggested that
a union victory could result in the loss of benefits. One of the
letters also suggested that the company might fail to reach an
agreement with the union, which failure could lead to a strike,
no paychecks, and permanent replacements. 0 Because the let-
ters contained no facts supporting these predictions, the court
upheld the Board's finding that the employer had exceeded his
free speech rights. Even if the employer's predictions were made
in good faith, they could be interpreted by the employees as
threats of retaliation, absent supporting facts that the conse-
quences would occur outside the employer's control.41
The court applied that same reasoning to decide that a
statement made by one of Hasbro's department managers was
also unprotected. The manager had stated to one employee that
38. See NLRB v. Hasbro Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982).
39. 672 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 983.
41. Id. at 983-84.
1984] 625
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Hasbro " 'would never let another union in here[;] . . . they
would farm out the work or barring that, they would close down
the printing department for a year and take a business loss and
reopen after a year.' ,,42 The court held that because no factors
outside the employer's control were indicated as a reason for
closing down the plant, the statement was an implied threat of
retaliation, and not a prediction concerning the economic conse-
quences of unionization.
43
Employer predictions have been held to be unprotected
under Gissel if their support rests only on unwarranted hypo-
thetical assumptions. In NLRB v. Gibraltar Industries, Inc.,"
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the Board's
finding that a subcontractor for Gibraltar had committed an un-
fair labor practice by allowing three speeches to be made to its
employees by Gibraltar's president during an organizational
drive. The president's speeches portrayed an unfavorable future
for the subcontractor's employees if the plant was unionized,
and the court found this portrayal unacceptable for two reasons.
First, the president based his predictions on what the court
viewed as unwarranted hypothetical assumptions which did not
satisfy Gissel's objective fact standard. Second, the court consid-
ered the comments particularly threatening to the employees
and therefore unacceptable under Gissel since the employees
were fully aware that the president was one of their company's
principal customers.45
In TRW-United Greenfield Division v. NLRB,46 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a more stringent view of
the Gissel objective fact standard. Not only must an employer's
predictions contain supporting facts to meet the Gissel stan-
dard, but those facts must provide a causal link between specific
union demands and the predictions.47 In TRW-United, the court
considered two company communications with employees during
a union organization campaign at its Evans, Georgia plant. The
first communication involved a letter in which TRW-United
42. Id. at 985.
43. Id. at 986.
44. 653 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 1097-98.
46. 637 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. at 419. See Williams, Distinguishing Protected From Unprotected Cam-
paign Speech, 33 LAB. L.J. 265, 271 (1982).
[Vol. 35
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coupled a warning not to sign authorization cards until employ-
ees knew what their liabilities and obligations to the union
would be with a reference to the closing of the company's union-
ized plant in Plymouth, Michigan.48 The other communication
concerned a manager's statement to an employee that the com-
pany's Detroit plant had been closed because of excessive union
wage and benefit demands and that the company could close the
Evans plant and write it off as a tax loss in the event similar
demands were made at the Evans plant.49
In upholding the Board's finding that the company had vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the court held that both commu-
nications were threats to close the Evans plant if it unionized
and therefore were impermissible predictions of the economic
consequences of unionization under Gissel. The court found that
while the letter stated that the Plymouth plant was closed for
"economic reasons," it did not say what the reasons were nor did
it make reference to possible economic consequences at the Ev-
ans plant. In addition, the court found that testimony at the
Board hearing that the union had offered to negotiate lower
wages to keep the Plymouth plant open and that labor costs
were not a significant factor in the closing of either Michigan
plant validated the decision that the letter and statement were
coercive.50
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not adopt
this narrow interpretation of the Gissel objective fact standard
in Patsy Bee, Inc. v. NLRB. 1 In that case, the court held that
statements made by the company's president to individual em-
ployees during an organizational drive were within the protec-
48. 637 F.2d at 419.
49. Id. at 419-20.
50. Id.
51. 654 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981). In reaching its decision the majority of the court
did not follow the stricter interpretation of Gissel advocated by the dissent. The dissent-
ing justice construed the objective fact standard as requiring proof by the company that
unionization would in fact cause the loss of the two customers or that their loss would
inevitably cause the plant to close. Id. at 518-19. The dissenting justice based his view on
a statement from Gissel, which was a quote from the First Circuit's opinion in Sinclair.
The Supreme Court stated: "We . . . agree with the court below that '[c]onveyance of
the employer's belief, even though sincere, that unionization will or may result in the
closing of the plant is not a statement of fact unless, which is most improbable, the
eventuality of closing is capable of proof.'" 395 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting NLRB v. Sinclair
Co., 397 F.2d at 160). The Fifth Circuit also referred to this statement in its discussion of
the prediction in TRW-United. 637 F.2d at 419.
1984]
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tion of section 8(c) because they were supported by objective
facts.52
In Patsy Bee, the company president had predicted that
two of the company's principal purchasers, Jantzen and Artex,
would terminate their contracts if the plant went union and that
financially the company could not afford such a loss. 3 To sup-
port these statements the president referred to Jantzen and
Artex's established policies against contracting with union com-
panies. The president also offered to show interested employees
the company's financial records to illustrate the company's pre-
carious financial situation which would be seriously affected by
the loss of the companies' contracts. Additionally, he based his
comments on the consequences of unionization he had observed
at other plants, including one his father had operated. The court
found that these facts reflected probable consequences of union-
ization beyond the employer's personal control and, therefore,
the comments were protected speech under Gissel."
The circumstances surrounding an organizational campaign
have been important in determining whether an employer's com-
ments satisfy the Gissel standard. The following federal court
cases demonstrate the tendency of courts to cite contemporane-
ous unfair labor practices or the employer's past history during
unionization drives as reasons for finding a comment unpro-
tected. This evaluation of speech based on the employer's con-
duct is derived from the Supreme Court's statement in Gissel
that the scope of the employer's free speech right must be
viewed in the context of its labor relations setting.5
In Weather Tamer v. NLRB, 56 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered the background against which the
employer's statements were made to determine that they were
unprotected under Gissel. In Weather Tamer, during an election
campaign, the president of a textile plant made several speeches
in which he stated that he would close the plant if the union was
elected, and that a union would jeopardize the employees' jobs
because it would cause the prices of the company's product to
52. 654 F.2d at 517-18.
53. Id. at 516.
54. Id. at 517.
56. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
56. 676 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982).
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increase.57 At the same time these speeches were being made,
employees were being laid off as the company completed its fall
line of clothing. By the time the last speech was made, all the
production employees were out of work.5
This halt of production was a major factor in the court's
decision to uphold the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1) viola-
tion by Weather Tamer. While an employer's remarks consid-
ered alone might not be threatening, the court noted that they
may acquire a different meaning when "evaluated with respect
to the totality of the circumstances."59 The court held that the
employer's statements were not protected by section 8(c) be-
cause they were made against the backdrop of layoffs.6 0 The em-
ployer's speeches clearly indicated to the laid-off employees that
the future of their employment and the reopening of the plant
depended on a vote against the union. 1
The context of the employer's statement was the major fac-
tor in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB.as In Florida Steel, the court
found that two portions of a videotape produced by the com-
pany to discourage a union campaign violated previous court or-
ders and held the company in contempt.63 The court had in
three earlier decisions held that Florida Steel could not withhold
or delay regularly scheduled wage reviews and increases from its
unionized employees or employees considering a union, nor
57. Id. at 488-89. In one of these speeches, the president emphasized that the future
of the plant depended on the ability of the company to produce a quality garment at a
competitive price. In his final speech, he pointed out that manufacturers in the North-
east were going out of business everyday because union wages and benefits were pricing
them out of the market. Ten days before the election he mailed a letter, with an attached
list of companies that had been put out of business by foreign competition, to all em-
ployees. Id.
58. Id. at 490.
59. Id. at 488 (quoting NLRB v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 473 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1973)).
60. 676 F.2d at 490.
61. Id. Interestingly, in another phase of the case, the court held that Weather
Tamer had not violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act by closing this plant following a union
victory in the election. The court found that the plant was closed for legitimate business
reasons and not to chill unionism in other Weather Tamer plants. The court cited what
it called uncontroverted evidence that from the spring of 1978 on, sales of the company's
garments were declining. Id. at 490-91.
62. 648 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 234-35.
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could it threaten to do so. 6 4 Despite these orders, the company
included in the videotape a chart dramatically showing that the
workers in one of its nonunionized plants received a scheduled
wage increase without delay while workers in a unionized plant
did not because of union negotiations.65 In finding the company
in contempt, the court held the offending portion of the video-
tape to be a threat and therefore unprotected speech under
Gissel.661
In determining that the questionable part of the videotape
was a threat, the court considered not only the content of the
expression, but the context in which it was made. To the court,
what the employees could reasonably infer, as well as what the
employer intended to imply, was the issue. The court, therefore,
reviewed some of the company's past conduct and policies that
it believed might adversely affect the employees' interpretation
of the videotape's challenged portions.6 7 The court noted that
since 1966, wage increases had been based on the results of wage
surveys conducted periodically by the company. Because the
employees were aware of the practice, they could reasonably in-
terpret the videotape's message to mean that the presence of a
union was the only reason one set of employees did not get the
expected benefit.6 8
The court also found a concealed threat in the second por-
tion of the videotape, which described an incident at one of the
company's facilities and then warned: "The point is Don't Sign
Anything not a card or an attendance record or anything else,
unless you know what it means and what affect [sic] it could
have on you, your job, and your relationship with the Com-
pany."'6 9 While this warning would appear to a disinterested per-
son to be an innocent, and perhaps even wise, caution not to
sign anything without knowing its meaning, the court, citing
64. Id. at 234 n.2. The court noted that Florida Steel had a long history of litigation
before the Fifth Circuit and that the controversy between the company and the unions
had gone on so long that it could be compared to the legendary feud between the
Hatfields and the McCoys. Id. at n.1.
65. Id. at 237.
66. Id. at 236, 238.
67. Id. at 236-37.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 238 (punctuation and capitalization in original script).
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Gissel, considered it a threat.7 0 Gissel warned that innocent
sounding statements must be considered in light of the employ-
ment relationship and the tendency of employees "to pick up
intended implications of the [employer] that might be more
readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. '7 1 In considering
the warning in this context, the court found that it implied that
an employee's attendance at a union meeting or his signing of a
union card might adversely affect the employee's job and his re-
lationship with the company. The warning was therefore unpro-
tected speech and a violation of section 8(a)(1).
7 2
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also considered
the context of the employer's statement in deciding in J.P. Ste-
vens & Co. v. NLRB7 3 that a management speech exceeded the
bounds of section 8(c) protection. In J.P. Stevens, the com-
pany's regional group manager made a speech to the entire work
force at the company's Rocky Mount, Virginia plant during a
unionization campaign. In the speech, the manager predicted
that unionization would bring friction, dissension, strife, trouble,
and possibly serious violence. The court found that these com-
ments were unsupported by any objective evidence and far ex-
ceeded the limit set forth in Gissel that predictions be "carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact."74
In deciding that the speech was unprotected, the court, in
what the dissent called a change from the Fourth Circuit's es-
tablished position,7 5 considered J.P. Stevens' long standing his-
tory of repeated, willful and substantial violations of the Act.
The court stated that while a company's history of intransigence
could not, in and of itself, support an unfair labor practice find-
ing, past infractions are not to be ignored in labor cases as they
are in determining the guilt or innocence of a criminal defen-
dant. In section 8(a)(1) charges concerning an employer's
speech, part of the decision-making process is to determine the
impact of that speech on the minds of employees. To accomplish
this, it is necessary to consider the backdrop of intransigence
70. Id.
71. 395 U.S. at 617.
72. 648 F.2d at 239.
73. 638 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 685.
75. Id. at 688-90. Judge Field argued that such a departure from established law in
the circuit should be done only by an en banc court. Id. at 688.
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and retaliation against which the statement is made and re-
ceived.7" The court held that in light of J.P. Stevens' long his-
tory of coercion, the Rocky Mount employees could reasonably
infer that the manager's statements were outright threats that
violence and retaliation could result if they voted for the union.
The court observed that these workers were undoubtedly aware
of the company's history of employee coercion, and that the im-
pact of this type speech given by a high-ranking official would
not be lost on them. The court then concluded that because the
speech contained these threats, it could not be protected under
section 8(c).77
C. National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Board's interpretation and
application of the Gissel objective fact standard is often more
narrow than the varied views of the federal courts of appeals.
For instance, employer predictions concerning the effect of
unionization on their companies are frequently held to stricter
requirements of proof. The Board also considers, as do some fed-
eral courts, the context in which an employer makes a predic-
tion, and uses evidence of antiunion animus in the form of con-
temporaneous unfair labor practices and past company activities
to determine if the employer's statements are protected under
section 8(c).
The Board's narrow interpretation of the Gissel objective
fact standard was the basis for its decision in Centre Engineer-
ing, Inc.7 8 that an employer's speech was unprotected by section
8(c). In Centre, during an organizational campaign, the com-
pany's president had made a speech in which he discussed a
neighboring plant's experiences following unionization. He
pointed out that the plant's work force was reduced from 1,200
to 40 employees and that the company opened plants elsewhere,
including locations outside the United States.7 9 In a notice dis-
tributed earlier in the campaign, the company had suggested
that plant closings following unionization were caused by the in-
76. Id. at 680-81.
77. Id. at 685-86.
78, 253 N.L.R.B. 419 (1980).
79, Id. at 422.
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ability of companies to compete with the prices of foreign com-
petition as a result of burdensome union contracts that limited
company flexibility. The notice then emphasized that Centre
was also finding it more difficult each year to compete with for-
eign competition and that the company's future growth was de-
pendent upon a one hundred percent effort by all employees. 80
In deciding that these comments were unprotected speech,
the Board held that Centre's implication that the union was the
cause of the job losses was not supported by full explanations of
the total circumstances at the neighboring plant and that the
company itself had stated in a notice that no one knew "for
sure" why the plant's work force was reduced." Essentially,
Centre had failed to back its comments with facts that provided
a causal link between unionization and the plant's reduced work
force. Therefore, the comments were threats, creating an "atmo-
sphere of fear and futility"8 2 among Centre's workers.
The Board also held that numerous management comments
concerning the company's intended hard bargaining stance and
the inevitability of strikes if Centre unionized violated section
8(a)(1). In reaching its decision, the Board considered the com-
pany's unlawful activities in a past election campaign and found
that the present expressions were merely a continuation of these
impermissible tactics and therefore were outside the protection
of section 8(c).83
The Board continued its strict interpretation of Gissel in
Paul Distributing Co."4 when it upheld an administrative law
judge's finding that an employer's conversation with an em-
ployee was not protected by section 8(c). In Paul Distributing,
one of the company's owners had a heated conversation with an
individual employee, during a union organizational drive, in
which he stated that "he couldn't go union because he couldn't
80. Id. at 421-22.
81. Id. at 422-23.
82. Id. In reaching its decision, the Board overturned the administrative law judge's
determination that the comments were not unlawful threats of job loss through plant
closure or reduction of work and were therefore protected by section 8(c). The judge had
reasoned that "[r]ealities demonstrate that to enlihten [sic] and frighten is the central
objective [of propaganda] and to repress, through unfair labor practice findings, com-
ment so designed is to condone outright rejection of Section 8(c) without regard for fun-
damental statutory and constitutional principles." Id. at 422.
83. Id. at 423.
84. 264 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1982).
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afford it, he'd have to hire more guys, and that he'd probably
have to sell the business, or he was just going to have to get
out."
8
The Board agreed with the judge's holding that while the
comment was not an explicit threat to close the business, it was,
under Gissel, an implied threat based on speculation and not on
objective fact. The employer made his prediction on the basis of
personal assumptions concerning what the union would require
and what he would have to accept. The judge reasoned that
[tio say or imply that the union will insist on certain intolera-
ble work rules or working conditions, that the employer will be
forced to accede to them even though he is in fact financially
incapable of doing so, and that his accession will therefore
force him out of business, is to indulge in considerable
speculation. 6
The judge further observed that this type of unsupported pre-
diction concerning continued employment was the type of dan-
gerous comment to which employees are particularly sensitive
and which the Gissel standard was attempting to prevent. In
conclusion, the judge evaluated the circumstances in which the
comment was made, stating that the angry nature of the owner's
comment added a coercive tone to the statement.8 "
The Board's narrow interpretation of the Gissel standard is
being affected by recent changes in the Board's political make-
up. In Daniel Construction Co.,88 a decision handed down on the
same day as Paul Distributing, the Board, composed of a differ-
ent panel from that in Paul Distributing,e" upheld an employer's
comments under the protection of section 8(c). In reaching its
decision, the panel rejected arguments similar to the Board's
85. Id. at 1383.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1383-84.
88. 264 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982).
89. In Paul Distributing, the panel consisted of Board members Fanning, Jenkins,
and Zimmerman. Fanning and Jenkins were longtime members of the Board, having
been renominated through past Democratic and Republican administrations. Zimmer-
man was a Carter nominee to the Board. 264 N.L.R.B. at 1378-81. In Daniel Construc-
tion, the panel consisted of Board chairman Van de Water and members Hunter and
Jenkins. Van de Water and Hunter were recent nominees to the Board. Jenkins dis-
sented to the decision reached in Daniel. Id. 1983-84 FEDERAL REGULATORY DmEcTORY.
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reasoning in Paul Distributing."
In Daniel, the company's industrial relations vice president
had held small group meetings with its employees at various
plant sites during an organizational campaign by a construction
workers' union. In answer to an employee's question concerning
job security at the particular plant site where the meeting was
held, the vice president stated that the company for whom
Daniel was working had the right to cancel the company's con-
tract with 30 days notice if Daniel could not maintain a competi-
tive posture.91
The Board rejected the administrative law judge's holding
that the statement was a prediction that unionization would
cause Daniel to become noncompetitive and that this type of
prediction was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Gissel. The
Board specifically rejected the judge's reasoning that the failure
by the vice president to explain the various ways in which the
company could become noncompetitive directly equated unioni-
zation with noncompetitiveness. The Board found that nothing
in the statement or the context in which it was made supported
the conclusion that the statement constituted an implicit threat
that Daniel automatically would terminate its workers upon
unionization. The Board held that the vice president's statement
was not a prediction, but a mere statement of fact, and therefore
was protected by section 8(c). e2
In addition to applying Gissel in unfair labor practice cases
such as those just discussed, the Board has also applied the
standards to representation cases. While the Board professes to
adhere to its policy established in General Shoe that section 8(c)
does not apply to representation cases,93 it continues to use the
90. 264 N.L.R.B. at 570-71. The panel rejected the dissent's argument that the vice
president's statements were not backed by objective facts and that there were no
grounds for believing that the company's customers would cancel or indications that the
union would make demands that would make Daniel noncompetitive. The majority also
rejected another longstanding Board analysis when it refused to follow the dissent's sug-
gestion that the statement in dispute should be viewed in context with Daniel's many
contemporaneous unfair labor practices. Id. at 571-72.
91. Id. at 569, 571.
92. Id. at 569-70.
93. See Rosewood Mfg. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 420 (1982). In Rosewood, the Board
agreed with the regional director's recommendation that the election be set aside and a
second one held because statements made by the employer destroyed the laboratory con-
ditions and prevented the employees from expressing a free choice in the election. The
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Gissel analysis to determine whether an employer's comments
have affected the laboratory conditions under which a represen-
tation election is to be held. The discussion of the following two
cases illustrates how strictly the Board makes that application.
In A.J. Schmidt Co.,94 the Board held that the employer
had interfered with an election by threatening to close the plant
if the union won the election. 5 During an organizational drive,
the company distributed literature to its employees in which it.
stated that it needed to remain competitive and productive to
survive, and that the union could only hurt the company's abil-
ity to do so. The company argued that if it were forced to raise
its prices beyond what the market would bear, its workload
would substantially decrease. It also named local unionized com-
panies which had either gone out of business or laid off large
numbers of employees, and emphasized the effect of strikes at
some of these companies."8
The Board rejected the acting regional director's finding
that the literature was merely a prediction of the possible eco-
nomic effects of increased costs due to higher wages and bene-
fits. The Board instead held that these predictions were threats
that loss of jobs would automatically result from a union victory.
Applying Gissel, the Board held that because the employer did
not present any demonstrable evidence that unionization caused
other plants to close or lay off workers or that unionization of
Schmidt could lead to the same result, the employer unlawfully
threatened its employees and thus interfered with the election.9
The Board held in Associated Roofing & Sheet Metals Co.98
that an employer's speech to his employees interfered with a
representation election, and ordered a second one to be con-
ducted.99 In his speech to employees the day before the election,
employer's statements had linked employees' selection of a union with unprofitability,
low productivity, subsequent plant closure, and job loss. In its opinion, the majority re-
minded the dissent that for over three decades the Board has maintained that section
8(c) was intended by Congress to apply only to unfair labor practice cases and not to
representation proceedings. Id. at 420 (citing General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948)
and Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962)).
94. 265 N.L.R.B. 1646 (1982).
95. Id. at 1647.
96. Id. at 1646.
97. Id. at 1646-47.
98. 255 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1981).
99. Id. at 1349-50. The union lost the election at issue by a vote of 30 to 15.
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the president of the company equated a vote for the union with
the close of the employer's business and, hence, the loss of the
employees' jobs. To support his statement, the president told
the employees that union men were not favored by open-shop
contractors in the Carolinas, and also indicated that only two
percent of all construction in progress in North Carolina, where
the company was located, was being performed by union
contractors. 100
The Board found the statement objectionable because it
conveyed to the employees that unionization would result in the
inability of the company to secure work from other businesses
that would not do business with a unionized company. The
Board rejected the employer's argument that his supporting
statements were objective facts that would stand up to a Gissel
analysis and stated that the low status of unions in a particular
industry does not clearly indicate that employers in that indus-
try will refuse to deal with firms that are unionized.101 In re-
jecting the employer's contention, the Board gave an illustration
of what it considered to be a statement that met the objective
fact standard in Gissel. If a union has indicated that it will de-
mand a certain level of compensation, the employer may make a
showing supported by objective facts that meeting these de-
mands would make the company fatally noncompetitive. Since
the statement in Associated Roofing did not meet this narrow
illustration of Gissel, it constituted an improper threat and fa-
tally tainted the election.
1 0 2
D. Summary
It has been fourteen years since the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gissel. The preceding sample of recent federal courts of
appeals cases and Board decisions illustrates that employers in
1984 are no closer to knowing what they can lawfully say to their
employees concerning the effect of unionization than they were
in 1969. While the basic parameters of analysis may be deline-
ated, what constitutes an objective fact upon which a lawful pre-
diction must be made and the certainty with which the probable
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consequences must be demonstrated are not capable of being
precisely stated. The answers vary according to the circuit and
the particular panel hearing the case. What constitutes pro-
tected speech in the Eighth Circuit might not withstand the
scrutiny of the Fifth Circuit,10 3 and even though an employer
can usually count on the National Labor Relations Board to ap-
ply a narrow interpretation of Gissel, that view changes as the
political composition of the Board changes.0'0 In 1984 it would
not be unusual for a decision concerning an employer's speech to
shift from protected to unprotected as it progresses from the ad-
ministrative law judge to the Board and finally to the federal
courts of appeals. In light of this uncertainty and the signifi-
cance of the constitutional right at issue, it is time for the Board
and the courts to reconsider their control of free speech in the
labor setting.
IV. A COMPARISON OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH DECISIONS AND
GENERAL FIRST AMENDMENT DECISION MAKING
A. First Amendment Decision Making
The first amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from making any law that would abridge the
freedom of speech. 05 Since its adoption as part of the Bill of
Rights in 1791, the amendment has been the subject of much
debate and discussion concerning its meaning and the breadth of
its prohibition. 106 Today much of the discussion and judicial
analysis has settled into two distinct areas: to what extent can
government restrict speech according to the time, place, or man-
ner in which it is presented and to what extent can government
restrict speech because of its content. The controversy concern-
ing an employer's free speech rights as discussed in this Note
encompasses both of these areas. In deciding whether an em-
ployer's comments are protected, the courts and the Board con-
103. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
105. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
106. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 715-18 (1978).
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sider primarily the content of the speech, but their evaluation of
the content's acceptability is intertwined with the speech's tim-
ing and the manner in which it is made.107
Under modern first amendment doctrine, the government's
power to forbid expression because of its content is restricted to
very limited circumstances.108 The Supreme Court has held that
the first amendment embodies the principle that "government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 10 9 The limited circum-
stances in which the Court has allowed restrictions create two
exceptions. Certain categories of speech, such as obscenity,
"fighting words," and purely commercial speech, are less favored
in the scheme of first amendment values and can be regulated or
prohibited with a relatively modest showing of need.110 The
other exception arises when the expression is relatively certain
to provoke adverse consequences in a particular circumstance
and the threat of these consequences is immediate and serious,
even if the content would receive first amendment protection in
a different context. The government may, therefore, suppress
some forms of speech because of the evils that are likely to re-
sult.1 Because the potential for government abuse is inherent,
this type of speech regulation must be narrowly drawn and must
serve a compelling state interest.112
B. Employer Free Speech
Employer speech does not fall into either category of re-
stricted speech as defined by the Supreme Court in its general
first amendment decisions, yet it has been repeatedly limited by
the Board and some federal courts since the enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act and its amendment by the Taft-
107. See, e.g., Weather Tamer v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982); Florida Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1981); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676
(4th Cir. 1980).
108. Case Comment, "It Takes More Than Money to Fly Delta. It Takes Nerve.":
Union Secondary Boycott Publicity and the First Amendment: Delta Air Lines, 67
MINN. L.REv. 1235, 1242 (1983).
109. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
110. Case Comment, supra note 108, at 1243. See also J. NowAK, supra note 106, at
831-47, 789-94, 767-80.
111. Case Comment, supra note 108, at 1243.
112. Id. (citing L. Tams, AmmcA CONsTrrunONAL LAW § 12-2 (1978)).
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Hartley Act. Both the judiciary and the Board have articulated
two basic arguments for this limitation within the labor context,
neither of which has any relationship to general first amendment
analysis.
First, the argument is made that two first amendment rights
are in conflict-the employees' right of association and the em-
ployer's freedom of speech. Because these are equal rights, a bal-
ancing between them must be made.113 This argument has its
genesis in a statement made by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co.1 14 In discussing an employer's free speech
rights, the Court stated that "an employer's right cannot out-
weigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as
those rights are embodied in [section] 7 and protected by [sec-
tion] 8(a)(1) and the proviso to [section] 8(c)."
115
By using this statement as the basis for the balancing of
competing first amendment rights, proponents are misreading
the Court's meaning. The equal rights to which the Court was
referring were the statutory rights of both parties under the Act.
Preceding the above quote, the Court had discussed an em-
ployer's rights under section 8(c) and had observed that the sec-
tion was merely an implementation of the first amendment. The
Court considered the conflict as one between two statutory
rights and ignored the constitutional issue.
In addition, the competing first amendment rights argument
is a faulty interpretation of what the constitutional right of asso-
ciation encompasses. According to Supreme Court analysis, the
right of association is protected only from state action,"1 6 not
employer action. Instead of a conflict between two equal consti-
tutional rights, the conflict is actually between the employer's
first amendment right and the employees' statutory rights as ex-
pressed in the National Labor Relations Act. In a conflict be-
tween a constitutional right and a statutory right, basic princi-
ples of judicial analysis require that the constitutional right take
precedence over the statutory right.
113. See Berghel & Dempsey, Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act:
Giving It Meaning, 32 MERCER L.R.v. 575, 586 (1981)(citing NLRB v. Intertherm, Inc.,
596 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1979)); Comment, The Threat or the Announcement of Plant
Closure?, 32 MERCER L.REv. 609, 613 (1981).
114. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
115. Id. at 617.
116. See J. NowAK, supra note 106, at 795-808.
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The second argument frequently made by proponents of
limiting the free speech rights of employers is also based on a
comment by the Court in Gissel. The Court stated:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression
... must be made in the context of its labor relations set-
ting.... And any balancing of... rights must take into ac-
count the economic dependence of the employees on their em-
ployers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of
that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter
that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested
ear.117
Because employees are economically dependent upon their em-
ployer, they are not inclined to go against what the employer
tells them;1' 8 it is therefore argued that there must be some con-
trols on what the employer says about unions.
While this argument has some merit, the Board and the
courts use it to stretch restrictions of speech beyond levels used
in general first amendment analysis. This can easily be seen by
comparing the restrictions on employer speech with the restric-
tions placed on speech that causes adverse consequences in par-
ticular circumstances. Before the latter can be restricted, the ad-
verse consequences must be immediate, certain, and serious, and
the restraints placed on speech must be narrowly drawn to fit
the need for the specific instance.119 The Board and the courts,
however, do not employ such stringent standards in evaluating
whether an employer has the right to speak about the effect of
unionization on his company. The employer's comments are
evaluated, not on whether they will have an immediate, certain,
or serious adverse effect on the employees' free choice, but on
whether they are based on objective facts that can be proved as
determined by the body deciding the case.
As demonstrated in the discussion of recent cases in the
preceding section, the Board and some courts often make this
determination arbitrarily and in such a manner that employers
have no guidance concerning what constitutes an objective fact.
In no other area of speech does the government have the right to
117. 395 U.S. at 617.
118. See Berghel & Dempsey, supra note 113, at 586.
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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restrict free expression without a showing of actual harm merely
because the expression is not based on objective facts. In addi-
tion, the Board and the courts do not, unlike in other areas of
speech restriction, draw the restraints on employers' speech nar-
rowly to fit the specific need. The prohibition is broadly defined,
and less intrusive alternatives are not considered.
V. ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESENT REGULATION OF
EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH
The Board's approach to employer free speech has been the
subject of much discussion, debate, and commentary over the
years. Recent articles analyzing the application of Gissel in con-
temporary court and Board decisions have concluded that the
line drawn between protected and unprotected employer cam-
paign speech is so speculative that employers, unions, and even
the Board are in the "extremely unenviable position of travelling
a very costly route to ascertain, case by case, whether the law
has been violated." 120 With these criticisms have come numerous
suggestions for alternate approaches to Board policy. A con-
sideraton and evaluaton of several of these may help to clarify
the problem further and lead to a suggested solution.
A. A Return to Strict Neutrality
One possible approach to the problem is for Congress to leg-
islate a return to the employer strict neutrality policy practiced
by the Board during its first years.1 21 With this approach the
employer would have no trouble ascertaining what he could law-
fully say to his employees concerning the effects of unionization;
he would be restrained from saying anything. This approach,
however, would have great difficulty withstanding a constitu-
tional attack.
An employer's right to free speech has long been recognized
as protected by the first amendment. Under general first amend-
ment analysis, any restriction of an employer's rights must be
narrowly drawn to serve an important countervailing state inter-
120. Williams, supra note 47, at 280-81. See also Berghel & Dempsey, supra note
113, at 584.
121. Comment, supra note 5, at 773.
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est. While some suggest that in 1935 the federal government had
an important interest in establishing a viable balance of eco-
nomic forces by supporting unionization, and therefore a consti-
tutionally acceptable right to restrict speech, that countervailing
state interest no longer exists. In 1984 labor unions are no longer
at a disadvantage with management, but are an integral part of
the American economy.122 Furthermore, even if a countervailing
interest, such as insuring noncoercive elections, were established,
a total prohibition of employer free speech would not meet the
requirement that restrictions on free speech be narrowly drawn.
This state interest could be met by less restrictive means than
strict neutrality.
B. Elimination of Specific Aspects of Present Board Policy
Commentators criticizing the Board frequently advocate
eliminating specific aspects of Board decisions they find offen-
sive rather than suggesting a totally different approach to the
problem. Most concede that some type of Board supervision is
necessary, but object to how broadly and inconsistently it is
applied.
One approach advocates abandoning the "total context"
doctrine while continuing the substantiated objective fact stan-
dard.12 3 Under this approach the employer is free to express his
views concerning the effect of unionization if he relates only true
facts, and cannot be held to have committed an unfair labor
practice merely because these objective statements were made in
the context of other unfair labor practices or in light of the em-
ployer's adverse labor relations history. The Board should re-
frain from finding implied or veiled threats in what would be
acceptable statements or from inferring an adverse impact upon
the employees' free choice. 2
The basis for abandoning the "total context" doctrine is
that a finding that an employer's speech, viewed in the total
context of the campaign, has had a coercive impact on employ-
ees is nothing more than pure conjecture by the Board. In claim-
ing that the Board has no reliable basis for presuming a coercive
122. Id. at 773-74.
123. Berghel & Dempsey, supra note 113, at 587.
124. Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 595, 597 (4th Cir. 1971)).
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impact or for presuming that its regulation can make the elec-
tion process more rational or intelligent, proponents of this ar-
gument frequently cite Getman's empirical study of representa-
tion elections in the early 1970's, which concluded that employer
or union speeches have little effect on how employees vote.
125
Advocates of this view also argue that the Board's policy con-
flicts with our national policy in political elections, in which ac-
cess to information from all sides is not only encouraged but is
considered fundamental to the concept of informed decision-
making. It seems incongruous, they argue, that the worker who
is entrusted with the responsibility of understanding complex
foreign and economic issues is unable to understand labor issues,
such as layoffs and strikes, addressed in employer speeches dur-
ing an organizational campaign.
1 26
Another approach to the problem of employer free speech
would leave intact the Board's present interpretation of section
8(c), but apply it to representation cases as well as unfair labor
cases. 127 Advocates argue that this approach merely gives effect
to the original intent of Congress in enacting section 8(c). In
1947 Congress believed that the Board was unduly curtailing
employers' first amendment rights and enacted section 8(c) to
ensure those rights full protection. By setting aside an election
because an employer's comments, although within the bounds of
section 8(c), upset the election's laboratory conditions, the
Board is, in essence, denying an employer the exercise of a right
125. Id. at 585 (quoting J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UmoN REPREsENTA-
TION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALrrY 147 (1976)). Cf. Lachman, Freedom of Speech in
Union Representation Elections: Employer Campaigning and Employee Response, 1982
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 755 (1982) (Lachman concludes from her risearch that a
level of employer speech exists which does chill an employee's free choice in a represen-
tation election.).
126. Berghel & Dempsey, supra note 113, at 585-86. Contra NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Court refused to find an analogy between political and
representation elections and stated:
[W]hat is basically at stake [in a representation election] is the establishment
of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economi-
cally dependent employee and his union agent, not the election of legislators or
the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined
and where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and
employers as a class freer to talk.
Id. at 617-18.
127. See Comment, supra note 5, at 777-79; Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at
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Congress intended to protect.128
Proponents of this approach also argue that the Board's ap-
plication of the laboratory conditions standard in representation
cases violates the first amendment.129 The Board has held that
although section 8(c) is not applicable in representation cases,
the first amendment is.130 Its decisions, however, do not reflect
this consideration. Noncoercive campaign speech is regularly the
basis for finding violations of the laboratory conditions standard,
resulting in a chilling of the employer's first amendment rights.
These decisions are reached without applying any type of first
amendment analysis. The Board makes no attempt to narrowly
draw its restrictions on noncoercive speech or to devise less in-
trusive means of protecting election laboratory conditions to
avoid interference with first amendment freedoms.131 Propo-
nents of this view believe that the application of section 8(c) to
representation cases would cure these first amendment problems
since section 8(c) not only restates constitutional free speech
guarantees but serves as a test of unprotected coercive speech as
well.
13 2
While these two approaches are thought-provoking attempts
to solve the problem caused by the Board's present approach to
employer free speech, they have several significant deficiencies.
Basically, they offer only partial solutions, not a panacea. Each
attacks one weakness in the Board's present procedure while
leaving other equally weak standards intact. By continuing the
objective fact standard, the first approach ignores the chilling
effect on employer free speech created by the Board's narrow
application of that standard. It also fails to acknowledge that its
argument for abandoning the "total context" doctrine applies
equally to the objective fact standard. The second approach,
which would apply section 8(c) to representation cases, ignores
completely the inability of the Board and the federal courts
under the varied interpretations of Gissel to articulate a clear
and reliable standard for applying section 8(c) to employer com-
ments. Instead of protecting an employer's free speech rights in
128. Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at 547.
129. Id. at 549-59.
130. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
131. Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at 549-59.
132. Id. at 559.
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representation cases, section 8(c) as presently applied would
only serve to further restrain the exercise of those rights.
The major deficiency in these approaches, however, is the
avoidance of the first amendment issue. While the second ap-
proach discusses first amendment problems in representation
cases, it fails to evaluate section 8(c) and the Board and courts'
interpretation of it as a cure-all. Both approaches concede the
necessity of some regulation of the content of employer speech
without addressing the fundamental issue of how that regulation
measures up to basic first amendment analysis.
C. The Right to Reply
Another suggested solution to the employer free speech
problem recognizes the necessity of Board regulation of repre-
sentation elections to ensure employer noncoercion, but advo-
cates a change of direction in that regulation. Instead of a com-
prehensive regulation of speech content, the proponents of this
solution believe the Board should accord each party an opportu-
nity to make an effective reply to the statements of the other.133
This approach was suggested in the sixties by Professor Bok
in his classic article on NLRA election regulation."" Bok rea-
soned that imposing restrictions on the content of speeches
threatened established rights and departed from normal princi-
ples governing political elections. In addition, he foresaw the
problems emanating from Gissel and its progeny when he ob-
served that restrictions on speech content "resist every effort at
clear formulation and tend inexorably to give rise to vague and
inconsistent rulings which baffle the parties and provoke litiga-
tion.'1 35 Bok argued that the' right-to-reply alternative would
have three significant advantages. First, and most importantly,
it would alleviate the need for expansive controls over the con-
tent of speech. Second, a set of rules governing the right to reply
would provide clear, objective guidance to both parties. Conse-
quently, clear rules would reduce not only the inconsistencies in
133. Comment, supra note 5, at 778-79.
134. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAnv. L.REv. 38 (1964). This approach was also a
conclusion in the Getman study. J. GErMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRE-
SENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 157 (1976).
135. Bok, supra note 134, at 92.
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Board decisions, but also the amount of litigation, making Board
enforcement more effective and less expensive.13
While this approach recognizes the first amendment prob-
lem and attempts to deal with it in a fresh way, Professor Bok
did not see it as a perfect substitute for regulation of speech
content. He believed that the Board would still have 'to regulate
clear threats of retaliation because the right to reply would be
inadequate protection in this situation. 137 He did not, however,
address the means by which this could be accomplished within
general first amendment analysis parameters.
D. Complete Deregulation of Election Speech
Another possible solution to the problem of employer free
speech articulated by some commentators is the deregulation of
all aspects of representation election speech. This approach is
largely based on the conclusion of the Getman empirical study
of NLRB representation elections that employees are not signifi-
cantly discouraged from electing a union despite allegedly coer-
cive pre-election remarks of an employer, including threats of
retaliation and promises of benefit. Proponents of the deregula-
tion of speech suggest that in light of the enhanced sophistica-
tion and education of present day workers and their familiarity
with labor-management relations, today's employees are less in-
timidated by "coercive" employer speech than were their prede-
cessors. Therefore, the Board has no need to regulate, or possi-
ble interest in regulating, employers' speech and should not be
allowed to find unfair labor practices or set aside elections be-
cause of that speech. 38
Attacks on this approach are primarily based on criticism of
its reliance on the Getman study. Opponents question the
study's statistical methods, conceptualization of the problem,
and limited geographical survey area.'39 They caution against
136. Id. at 91-92.
137. Id. at 91.
138. Comment, supra note 5, at 775.
139. Id. at 776. The study was conducted entirely in the Midwest. Critics suggest
that such a narrow geographic area might yield atypical data because of the kinds of
industry concentrated there or its particular history of labor relations. Id. For a general
criticism of the study, see Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a
Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1181 (1976)(this article was part of a
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the use of an unconfirmed and questionable empirical study to
effect such a drastic change in the Board's longstanding policy of
speech regulation under the Act.140
Totally lacking in either the proponents' or the critics' argu-
ments is a discussion of the first amendment issue. At best, a
type of general first amendment analysis could be inferred from
the reasoning of the proponents of this view. By concluding from
the Getman study that employees are not coerced by their em-
ployer's comments and that the Board therefore has no need to
regulate that speech, proponents imply that the Board has no
countervailing state interest that would support a restriction of
the employer's first amendment rights. However, no such analy-
sis is actually articulated or criticized. Essentially, both sides
suggest that the Board pursue a policy without first considering
how the choice of that policy affects first amendment rights.
E. Application of the First Amendment
No approach to the problem of an employer's free speech
rights can be effective until the basic constitutional issue is
faced and resolved. An employer derives his rights from the
Constitution, not from legislation. In determining whether an
employer's expression is protected or unprotected, the Board
and the courts must follow first amendment mandate and em-
ploy the type of analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in
general first amendment cases. Before an employer's speech may
be restricted, a substantial countervailing state interest must be
expressed and the restriction narrowly drawn to protect that in-
terest without unduly limiting free speech.
In applying this standard, the Board might articulate a
compelling state interest derived from its power under the Act
to insure that union representation elections are fairly con-
ducted.14 1 While the Board justifies its present approach to em-
ployer free speech rights with this statutory power, under a first
amendment approach the Board could not restrain speech with-
out a showing that the speech would actually harm the fair con-
duct of the election. Such restraints on that particular speech
symposium on the Getman study).
140. Comment, supra note 5, at 776.
141. See Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 1, at 549.
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would then be narrowly drawn. The courts, some commentators,
and even Congress in its construction of section 8(c), have ex-
pressed the belief that threats of retaliation or promises of bene-
fits are types of speech that produce coercion in elections. Less
overt threats or promises, such as predictions, however, cannot
be as easily characterized as harmful. In protecting its fair elec-
tions, the Board could narrowly restrain the expression of
threats and promises by prohibiting overt statements, while us-
ing a less intrusive alternative, such as Professor Bok's right-to-
reply doctrine, for covert expressions.
This proposed application of general first amendment anal-
ysis to the problem of an employer's free speech rights should
apply to both unfair labor practice cases and representation
cases. While it may be argued that an employer's free speech
rights are not restrained in representation cases because the re-
quirement of a second election has no adverse consequences on
the parties, practically speaking, this is untrue.142 Forcing an
employer to go through another election or denying him the ben-
efit of winning the first election because his noncoercive speech
violated the laboratory conditions standard constitutes a burden
upon the exercise of his first amendment rights and, in reality,
restrains his right to speak.143 Therefore, the protection afforded
by the application of a general first amendment analysis is as
crucial to representation cases as it is to unfair labor practice
cases. Only by according an employer full constitutional protec-
tion in all areas where his right to speak is now restrained will
the confusion, uncertainty, and costly litigation generated by
present Board policy be brought to an end.
VI. CONCLUSION
The role of employer free speech in representation elections
has been an unresolved issue since the enactment of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in 1935. Attempts to deal with the
problem through legislative amendment and judicial interpreta-
tion have produced more confusion than solution, and ap-
proaches suggested in the legal literature have been little more
than reworkings of these unsuccessful efforts. As a consequence,
142. Id. at 550-51.
143. Id. See also Bok, supra note 134, at 68.
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employers today are faced with conflicting signals concerning
what they can lawfully say, resulting in an unconstitutional chill
on the exercise of their first amendment rights.
The problem remains today because the federal courts, the
Board, and even the commentators have refused to deal ade-
quately with the constitutional issue. These groups have consist-
ently accepted the application of a different analysis for free
speech issues in the labor setting than that applied in other con-
texts. Close analysis of the various reasons given in support of
this differentiation reveals reliance on false assumptions and
faulty constitutional analysis. Employer free speech rights will
not be sufficiently protected until this approach is abandoned
and general first amendment analysis is applied to questions
concerning an employer's comments. Under this approach, the
Board could still restrict an employer's speech, but would be re-
quired to articulate a countervailing state interest and then
draw its restrictions narrowly to serve that interest. Both the
employer and the employees could be protected, but in a consti-
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